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Must we be Faithful to Original
Meaning?
Jack M. Balkin*
I am grateful to the editors of the Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies for arranging
this symposium on Living Originalism and to the contributors to this sympo-
sium for their fine essays. Living Originalism is about many things: the role of
constitutional faith, the possibility of constitutional redemption, the production
of democratic legitimacy through the work of political and social movements,
and the processes of constitutional change. It advocates both a form of origin-
alism and a form of living constitutionalism, and it argues that the two theories
are actually two sides of the same coin. The essays in this symposium, however,
focus primarily on the originalist aspects of the book; they discuss what original
meaning is and why constitutional interpreters need to be faithful to it.
Therefore I have organized this reply as an essay on original meaning,
moving back and forth between the views of the various contributors, which
respond to each other as much as they do to me.
Original meaning and popular sovereignty
Re’em Segev’s essay1 asks the most basic question: why we should interpret the
Constitution according to its original meaning? Segev considers and rejects a
number of possible reasons; for example, he points out that if the justification is
democracy, then it is not clear that interpretation according to original meaning
promotes democracy today.2 Moreover, we might want to trade off democracy
for other important values.3
In Living Originalism, I do not argue that we must follow original meaning
because doing so furthers democracy. Adhering to original meaning might fur-
ther democracy or it might not. Rather, I argue that we should interpret the
Constitution according to its original meaning (i) because of the way that the
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1 Re’em Segev, The Argument for (Living) Originalism: Comments on Jack Balkin’s Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013).
2 Id. at 40–1.
3 Id. at 41–2.
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Constitution became law and (ii) because of the reasons why it continues as
law today.
The Constitution became law because of a series of acts of popular sover-
eignty. A proposal was circulated among the various states to abandon the
existing Articles of Confederation and to adopt a proposed Constitution.
States elected delegates to ratification conventions to vote on the proposal,
and enough states eventually ratified the Constitution to create a working gov-
ernment according to its terms. (Article VII provides that, upon ratification of
nine states, the Constitution is established as basic law among the ratifying
states.)
In Living Originalism, I assume that this act of popular sovereignty was
adequate to abandon the Articles of Confederation and to make the proposed
Constitution law. One might argue that the ratification did not make the
Constitution law. After all, Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation
stated that the Articles could not be changed except by unanimous agreement
of all states; moreover, it claimed that the union created by the Articles was
perpetual and could not be dissolved—except, presumably, by the agreement of
all the states.4 The Constitution was ratified by the ninth state, New
Hampshire, in June 1788, and the new government began functioning in
1789. When the Constitution was ratified, several states had not yet agreed,
and it was certainly possible that some might never agree. So from the stand-
point of the Articles, the new Constitution was illegal.
Yet if the Constitution nevertheless became law in 1788, and the Articles
were successfully abandoned, the best explanation is that the public, acting
through their representatives, invoked their constitutive power to change the
form of government. They simply did so outside of the existing legal process
provided for in the Articles of Confederation. Therefore the reason why the
Constitution became law is popular sovereignty.
To be sure, the process of ratification was hardly democratic by our contem-
porary standards. Most adults could not vote; women were excluded, and most
blacks were held in slavery. Nevertheless, as Akhil Amar points out, for its time
the process was remarkably democratic, as great an advance toward popular
sovereignty as one could have expected in an age in which most of Europe—
indeed most of the world—was still governed by kings and princes.5
The fact that the Constitution became law through an act of popular sover-
eignty, however, does not mean that the Constitution promotes democracy
today. Parts of it might be undemocratic judged by contemporary standards.
4 Articles of Confederation, Article XIII (‘‘And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed
by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of
them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the
legislatures of every State.’’)
5 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 7, 17–18 (2005) (noting the remarkably
democratic features—for its time—of the Constitution’s ratification process).
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For the same reason, it also does not follow that interpreting the Constitution
according to its original meaning is justified because doing so promotes dem-
ocracy today. In fact, it is possible that interpreting the Constitution according
to original meaning exacerbates some of the undemocratic and unjust aspects
of the Constitution, at least judged by contemporary standards.6 (One familiar
example is the malapportionment of the Senate.) The point of the argument
from popular sovereignty, rather, is to explain how the Constitution
became law and how it displaced the previous constitution, the Articles of
Confederation.
In addition, the reason why the Constitution became law is not necessarily the
reason why it continues as law today. The Constitution continues as law today
largely for rule-of-law reasons; or more correctly, because of the way that
American legal culture understands and implements the rule of law. In a
continuously existing political system like the America’s, laws, even ancient
laws, continue in force (i) until they are modified or repealed or (ii) until
they expire, if the laws contain sunset provisions for their automatic expiration,
or if there is a generally recognized legal sunset norm that applies to laws
generally, or to laws of a certain kind.
No such sunset norm applies in the American legal system. Moreover, the
American people have not engaged in a subsequent act of repudiation of the
Constitution as they did with the Articles. The Constitution has been amended
many times, but it has never been abandoned in the way that the Articles of
Confederation were abandoned in the period between 1787 and 1788. The
public has not exercised its constituent power to replace the 1787 Constitution
with a new one.7
As I discuss later in this essay, the constituent power of the people continues
to operate in the realm of constitutional construction. But the exercise of
popular sovereignty through constitutional construction builds on the basic
framework; it does not reject it.
Thus, the best explanation of why the Constitution continues as law today is
the American legal culture’s conception of the rule of law: the text of the
Constitution is law and the law continues in force until it is repealed or chan-
ged. The text can be changed in several ways. We the People can act either
through existing legal processes—for example, through a new convention called
6 For a discussion of the undemocratic features of the American Constitution, see SANFORD LEVINSON,
FRAMED!: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON,
OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN
CORRECT IT) (2006).
7 Bruce Ackerman has argued that, although most Americans do not realize it, the USA has actually had
three different Republics, in which significant parts of the Constitution were altered in ways that were technically
illegal under Article V’s amendment rules. 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE The PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1988). Ackerman’s brilliant and provocative theory,
however, is not the generally accepted understanding of American constitutional history.
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under the authority of Article V—or through a new act of constituent power
that may or may not be consistent with the terms of the existing Constitution.
The last point is worth emphasizing. Throughout Living Originalism, I
assume that the American people are not being disingenuous when they say
that they are committed to the Constitution and that they want to be faithful to
it.8 I then ask what fidelity requires if people want to commit to this particular
plan for politics. I argue that fidelity requires, at a minimum, fidelity to original
semantic meaning and to the Constitution’s choice of rules, standards, and
principles. But this is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one.
Americans do not have to continue to accept their Constitution. As the
Declaration of Independence insists, ‘‘whenever any Form of Government be-
comes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government.’’9
Americans could refuse to be bound by their existing Constitution and start
over again. The American people can, as they did in 1788, reject their old
Constitution and adopt a new one. And, as in 1788, they do not have to abide
by the terms of the existing Constitution in order to do so. The current
Constitution is very hard to amend, but that does not mean that, in order to
abolish it, we must continue to follow its very difficult rules. That would prob-
ably not happen in the case of a political revolution, for example; and
Americans did not follow the Articles of Confederation’s rules in adopting
the 1787 Constitution.
To be sure, for the new constitution to be an act of constituent power,
Americans must come up with some procedure for ratifying a new constitution
that will widely be regarded as legitimate, even if not fully consistent with
Article V. What that procedure would be is beyond the scope of this essay.10
I simply note that, just as in 1788, at least some procedures that go beyond the
terms of the existing Constitution would probably be both sufficient and
broadly acceptable.
To sum up: the Constitution of 1787 became law because of an act of
popular sovereignty; it continues as law because of rule of law values, because
Americans continue to accept it as their basic law, and because no later exercise
of constituent power has displaced it.
Original meaning, the rule of law, and plans for politics
The same rule of law values that maintain the Constitution as law over time
also set basic requirements for constitutional interpretation. Interpreters must
give the words in ancient laws the same semantic meanings that the words had
8 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 38, 50 (2011).
9 Declaration of Independence (1776).
10 For one suggestion, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (arguing that a nationwide referendum is sufficient to amend the Constitution).
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when they were first adopted—to the extent that these meanings can be deter-
mined.11 In most cases, the contemporary semantic meanings of the words in
the Constitution are the same as they were at the time of their adoption. But in
a few cases they will differ, because language changes over time. When this
happens, interpreters should want to avoid puns and plays on words when they
become aware of them. They should choose the original semantic meaning and
not the contemporary semantic meaning. This approach to interpretation is the
most consistent with the rule of law idea that a duly enacted statute continues
in force as law until it is amended or repealed.
For this reason, the term ‘‘magazine’’ in Article I, section 8, refers to places
for storing ammunition, and not to printed material; the term ‘‘domestic
violence’’ in Article IV, section 4, refers to riots and insurrections, and not
to interspousal battery; and the guarantee of ‘‘a Republican Form of
Government’’ in the same clause refers to a government that is majoritarian,
representative, and nonmonarchical, but not to a government run by the
Republican Party, which was founded in 1854. In the context of American
legal culture—and many other legal cultures too, I assume—these are not
fair or appropriate readings of the text.
The same reasoning applies when the Constitution uses a generally recog-
nized term of art. Such words should continue to be understood as a term of
art, even if they have taken on a different meaning in contemporary language.
Nevertheless, some terms of art in the Constitution might be taken from the
common law and intended to incorporate common law reasoning. If so, then
these terms of art should be subject to continuous evolution, just as the
common law is.12
I argue for adhering to original meaning not only because of rule of law
values, but also because of my theory of what constitutions are and what
they are for.13 Even if my views about the purpose of constitutions do not
apply to all historical examples, I argue that they apply to the US Constitution.
I argue that the Constitution creates a plan for politics that must be built out
over time by successive generations.14 Therefore interpretive fidelity to the
Constitution requires, at a minimum, continuing to apply the same plan over
time until it is amended or abandoned. In order to ensure that we remain
faithful to the same plan over time, we should interpret the Constitution
according to the semantic meaning of its terms at the time of adoption
(to the extent that this content differs from contemporary usage), including
any generally recognized terms of art and including any inferences from context
11 Although I emphasize ‘‘semantic meanings’’ in this formulation, the basic framework must include some
pragmatic elements: these are inferences about meaning that readers glean from context, as I describe infra at
pp. 18–21.
12 See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2006).
13 See Balkin, supra note 8, at 4, 35–6.
14 See SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (comparing legal systems to social plans).
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necessary to understand the original meaning. If we substitute contemporary
usage, or neglect to take into account generally recognized terms of art, the
results might be more just or less just, but they will not be the same constitu-
tional plan. Put another way, the fact that we commit to follow a plan means
that some possible interpretive moves are not available to us.
Here is an example. Because of technological and cultural changes, the
spelling, pronunciation, and vocabulary of English are rapidly changing. It is
therefore not at all unlikely that someday the language of the 1787
Constitution might seem as archaic as Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales
appears to English speakers today. Article II, section 1 states that ‘‘The . . .
President of the United States of America. . . . shall hold office during the
term of four years.’’ Suppose that, over time, the word ‘‘four’’ comes to
mean ‘‘forever,’’ or ‘‘an unlimited amount,’’ and that the number [4] is nor-
mally signified by the word ‘‘foor.’’ Now imagine that the President argues that,
according to the contemporary meaning of the text, he is entitled to serve for
life. (Under the 22nd Amendment, ‘‘No person shall be elected to the office of
the President more than twice,’’ but because a single term of ‘‘four years’’ lasts
forever, this imposes no effective limits.) The President acknowledges that the
word ‘‘four’’ once meant [4], but he argues that contemporary meaning should
trump original meaning where the two differ, because contemporary meaning
has greater democratic legitimacy.
I argue that this is not a permissible interpretation of the Constitution, even
if the 1787 Constitution’s use of the word ‘‘four’’ to mean the number [4] has
become archaic and is never used in contemporary English. The President’s
use of contemporary meaning is not faithful to the basic plan for politics and
the plan has not been legitimately amended. In my view, the President is using
a play on words to accomplish an end-run around a hard-wired structural
provision designed to constrain the exercise of political power.
In this case, the linguistic change might be obvious—and everyone except
the President’s staunchest defenders would understand that applying contem-
porary meaning was not consistent with rule of law values or with political fair
play. There may be other changes in language, however, that few people might
notice until an important dispute arose. Yet the argument applies to these cases
as well.
Michael Dorf offers an example. Article I, section 8, clause 11 gives
Congress the power to ‘‘make rules concerning captures on land and water.’’
Suppose that it was clearly established that the term ‘‘captures’’ was a generally
recognized term of art in 1787 that referred only to the seizure of ships and
property, but not to the capture of persons.15 A group of peace activists
15 Several commentators have argued that this limitation is the best reading. See, eg, Ingrid Wuerth, The
Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1683, 1722–33 (2009). Nevertheless, as one might expect, the evidence
of past usage is complicated. See id. at 1723 (explaining that while there is ‘‘some support for the claim’’ that the
Captures Clause reaches regulation of prisoners, ‘‘there is [also more] countervailing evidence.’’)
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opposed to the harsh treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba argues
that ‘‘[e]nemy combatants captured abroad’’ are ‘‘entitled by this language to
be treated in accordance with the rules laid down by Congress.’’16 (Note that
Congress might be able to regulate the treatment of detainees under several
other enumerated powers, but Dorf’s question is whether Congress can do so
under the Captures Clause).17 The activists are unaware that the original
meaning of the Captures Clause differs from and is more limited than their
contemporary understanding. Dorf argues that ‘‘the peace activists have an
attractive account of this reading that ties it to congressional checks on the
President’s power to make war. Who is Balkin to deny them their reading?’’18
Far be it from me to prevent social movements from offering any constitu-
tional theories they want in the public sphere. A basic claim of Living
Originalism is that social and political mobilizations are the engines of consti-
tutional construction and help ensure the legitimacy of the constitutional
system over long periods of time. But the fact that people are free to offer
their own readings of the Constitution and persuade others to agree with them
does not mean that their readings are automatically either permissible con-
structions or faithful to the Constitution.19
Dorf objects that the peace activists’ argument cannot be deemed an imper-
missible construction because ‘‘the peace activists in [the] hypothetical example
believe they are keeping faith with the Constitution. Reading the Constitution
as an intergenerational document, they attribute to its words their contempor-
ary meaning.’’20 Note that Dorf does not argue that contemporary meaning
should always prevail over original semantic meaning; his point is merely ‘‘that
contemporary meaning can be a candidate for the best interpretation of a
constitutional provision’’ when it differs from original semantic meaning.21
16 Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2040 (2012).
17 For example, Congress has the power ‘‘[t]o define and punish . . . offences against the law of nations,’’
Article I, section 8, clause 10; ‘‘[t]o make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces,’’ id. at clause 14; ‘‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,’’ id. at clause 16; and ‘‘[t]o make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof,’’ id. at
clause 18.
18 Id. at 2041.
19 As I explain in Living Originalism, the processes of constitutional change involve a division of labor between
laypersons and legal professionals. Balkin, supra note 8, at 88, 332–4. Lawyers and judges translate the consti-
tutional claims of popular mobilizations into terms that make sense given professional norms; in particular, they
must articulate popular arguments in terms that are consistent with the constitutional framework. In this case, if
the Captures Clause were not available, lawyers could easily translate the peace activists’ arguments in terms of
Congress’s other enumerated powers. But the possibility always remains that lawyers could not reasonably trans-
late social movement claims into a theory that is consistent with the framework. Then the only available remedy
would be an amendment to the Constitution, or a new Constitution. Dorf appears to regard this as a defect of a
theory of constitutional interpretation. Dorf, supra note 16, at 2041, 2043. I regard it as a feature. If a consti-
tution is a plan for politics then it cannot be consistent with every possible claim that a social movement might
someday make.
20 Dorf, supra note 16, at 2041.
21 Id. at 2044.
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Dorf is confident that ‘‘[a]ny competent reader of modern English’’ will be able
to discard any unreasonable uses of contemporary meaning that might result.
‘‘We do not need semantic originalism to constrain contemporary readers from
adopting wacky interpretations of the text. Attention to context and common
sense will do just fine.’’22 As long as people sincerely believe that contemporary
semantic meaning is the best reading, the reading is a permissible construction.
I disagree. Sincerity is not the same thing as either faithful interpretation or
freedom from mistake. In my previous example, the President and his sup-
porters—who might also be activists—are also free to argue in the public
sphere that the President can serve forever. They might also sincerely believe
that this interpretation not only keeps faith with the Constitution, but also
redeems it and makes it, in Ronald Dworkin’s words, ‘‘the best it can be.’’23
And they might, through effective persuasion, move people’s judgements about
their position from being ‘‘wacky’’ or, as I would put it, ‘‘off-the-wall,’’ to being
widely accepted and even common-sense. Stranger things have happened in the
history of American constitutional law.
Common sense, after all, is not static; a central argument in Constitutional
Redemption is that what people regard as reasonable in law and politics is
shaped through political and social mobilization.24 But the sincerity of the
activists’ beliefs does not make their interpretation either faithful to the plan
or correct. Indeed, it must be possible that at least some interpretations that
people might sincerely believe to be faithful are not in fact faithful; otherwise
the Constitution cannot function as a plan for politics because it forbids noth-
ing and requires nothing.
Legal culture and interpretation
When we interpret the American Constitution, we should begin with the ori-
ginal meanings of the words of the ancient text, as best we can determine
them. For similar reasons, we should not adopt constructions that are incon-
sistent with the original semantic meaning of the text. Randy Barnett’s sym-
posium essay emphasizes this point.25 Inconsistency is more than a question of
propositional logic. Whether a construction is consistent or inconsistent with
the original meaning of an ancient text must be understood relative to the
permissible forms of statutory interpretation and construction available in a
22 Id.
23 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 53, 62, 77, 233, 248, 255, 257, 348, 379, 423 (1987).
24 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 12–14, 61–72,
178–83 (2011).
25 Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism: A Comment on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism, 7
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 42, 47 (2013).
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given legal culture.26 For example, Gematria—the calculation of numbers asso-
ciated with the letters in a given word or phrase in scripture—is a permissible
tool of interpretation in some elements of Jewish law. But calculating the num-
bers associated with the letters in the text of the First Amendment and com-
paring them to the numbers associated with other texts would not be a
permissible move in American legal culture. In American constitutional cul-
ture, using Gematria to develop constructions of the text of the American
Constitution would be inconsistent with a commitment to original meaning.
That is because of differences in legal culture, and differences in background
assumptions about legal texts and the permissible moves that interpreters may
make in understanding them. For example, in Jewish law, Gematria is permis-
sible because members of the relevant culture believe that it reveals divine
meanings that God has placed in the text. The numbers associated with
words are thus a kind of original meaning, although esoteric. American legal
culture does not assume that such hidden meanings have been embedded in
legal texts, or that they are part of the enforceable legal meaning of the text.
Barnett also argues that if we build constructions of the text based on the
fact that the text states a principle, we must make sure that we can always
explain our constructions as plausible readings of the text. Even if the text
contains a principle, we cannot abandon the text and only pay attention to
the principle.27 Barnett’s example is the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of
‘‘equal protection of the laws.’’ Barnett points out that this text is not simply
a general principle of equality; it is a guarantee of equal protection, and it is not
a guarantee of any sort of equal protection, but a guarantee of equal protection
of the laws.28
The distinction is important because some originalists argue for a particu-
larly narrow reading of these words. They maintain that the clause was de-
signed only to secure equal treatment by the executive in enforcing laws, but
that it does not constrain the legislature.29 It would follow that much of
modern equal protection jurisprudence is inconsistent with original meaning,
although some of it might be justified under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. In Living Originalism, I argue that this view of the 14th Amendment
is mistaken and that the equal protection clause applies to all branches of
the government.30 Nevertheless, Barnett’s point is that depending on how
26 See Balkin, supra note 8, at 352–3, n 16. Akhil Amar has offered a masterful demonstration of the multiple
ways that American legal culture uses the constitutional text to generate meaning. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre- Enactment History, 19
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 1 (2008); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L. J. 1385, 1390, 1396, 1435–8 (1992); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 349 (1985).
30 Balkin, supra note 8, at 220–1.
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we decide this question, we must be bound by the consequences in
constructions.
The original framework and democratic legitimacy
Barak Medina argues that a constitution cannot specify how it should be
interpreted. Therefore, we do not have to accept the adopters’ choice to or-
ganize constitutional language in terms of rules, principles, and standards.31
‘‘[T]here is no good reason,’’ Medina argues, ‘‘to recognize . . . the power of the
framers and adopters of the Constitution, to determine the method of inter-
pretation regardless of moral and sociological considerations.’’32
I agree with Medina that we are not required to adopt the framers’ theory of
how to interpret their words. But if we accept the Constitution as our plan and
if we commit to follow the plan over time, we must have a sense of what the
plan is. We must understand what our theories of interpretation and construc-
tion are working on; we must know what it is that we are being faithful to. I
believe that a Constitution’s choice of norms—hard wired rules versus abstract
principles or flexible standards—is not merely a question of interpretive con-
vention that is external to a plan. Rather, it is part of the economy of delega-
tion and constraint that is built into the plan.33 When we interpret the
Constitution, we must ascribe to the adopters, through their choice of
words, the purpose of foreclosing some things through hard-wired rules
while leaving other things open for future construction.
If one sees things in this way, then one will give the text what Medina calls
‘‘lexical priority:’’ we cannot adopt constructions that are inconsistent with the
text.34 The reason is not that text establishes its own authority; it is because of
the hypothetical imperative I mentioned earlier. If we want to accept the
Constitution as our plan for politics, the binding nature of the text is a con-
sequence of that choice.
Medina finds it entirely too convenient—perhaps too good to be true—that
under my reading the American constitution has many open-ended provisions,
which leave plenty of room for—and indeed require—subsequent construc-
tion.35 The possibility of constitutional construction, in turn, helps ensure
(but does not guarantee) the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution-in-prac-
tice over time.
But the reason that the Constitution contains lots of room for construction is
that the people who wrote it were neither omniscient nor fools. Many of them
31 Barak Medina, ‘‘Foundational’’ Originalism?: On Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 6 (2013).
32 Id. at 8.
33 Balkin, supra note 8, at 47–9; see also Shapiro, supra note 14 (arguing that law, as a form of social planning,
involves an economy of trust and distrust).
34 Medina, supra note 31, at 8.
35 Id. at 7–8.
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had experience in drafting state constitutions and in studying the confeder-
ations of other countries before they drafted the American Constitution.
They understood that a constitution cannot settle everything in advance, and
that many aspects of a constitution—including bills of rights—must be
expressed in terms of fairly open-ended language. Their assumptions are con-
firmed by the experience of constitution-making in other countries in the past
two centuries. So what looks like a happy accident is not really so. If Medina
and I were to write a constitution together, we would soon experience the same
kinds of limitations in our ability to control the future through mere words. We
would therefore choose a collection of rules, standards, principles, and silences
that necessarily left a great deal open for future development.
But what if the American Constitution was not written this way, Medina
asks? Suppose the adopters seriously miscalculated how to write a constitution
for the future. Would I still insist that we interpret it according to the adopters’
economy of delegation and constraint? Even if the Constitution was adopted by
procedurally legitimate methods, there is no guarantee that the adopters’
choice of language will be democratically or morally legitimate as time goes
on. Imagine, for example, a constitutional text that contained mostly rules,
with few opportunities for construction, that these rules were unjust, and
that they only got more unjust with time. Or suppose that the American
Constitution had contained a general interpretive clause that said: ‘‘This
Constitution shall be interpreted and applied according to the expectations
of people living at the time of the adoption of each of its provisions.’’36
If the Constitution contained such a text it would be very difficult for
Americans today to accept the text as our framework for politics, because
the Constitution would lack political and moral legitimacy. And if we could
not accept it as our Constitution, it would not be binding on us.
To be sure, such a Constitution might have produced a very different polit-
ical history. It might well have been eventually amended or abandoned, in
whole or in part. Americans might have created a new set of political conven-
tions for employing the text. For example, they might have jettisoned Article V
and treated the Constitution as amendable like a statute. They might have
treated the text as a purely political document like the Declaration of
Independence, or as a defeasible set of norms; or they might have simply
ignored certain parts that they found politically inconvenient. The
Constitution might have become more like Magna Carta—of largely symbolic
significance—or it might have been treated like an ancient statute embedded in
and therefore modifiable by a larger set of common-law conventions. (This is,
36 Medina argues that the framers of a constitution cannot prescribe the rules by which it should be inter-
preted. Medina, supra note 31, at 6. But in this hypothetical we imagine that later generations have agreed to be
bound by the Constitution’s text, and the text contains a clause further specifying the meaning of the text’s use of
standards and principles.
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in fact, similar to David Strauss’s view of how the Constitution actually
operates.)37
If Americans moved to one of these solutions, the new interpretive conven-
tions would probably have been achieved only through considerable political
struggle (or even violence) until they were widely accepted. Then that would be
the basic law accepted by the American people, rather than the original con-
stitutional framework. Perhaps this is how some countries have worked around
their constitutions; they have simply agreed to abandon the old plan, partially
or completely. But Living Originalism argues that this is not the best account of
the American experience. Americans do not understand themselves as having
abandoned their constitution, either in whole or in part. Therefore I have
offered an account of constitutional interpretation that makes the best sense
of that basic assumption of American politics.
Now it happens to be the case that the US Constitution does not contain
such a ‘‘original expected applications’’ clause. On the other hand, as Medina
points out, it does contain various rules that cannot be changed without Article
V amendment. For example, the Senate is malapportioned by population; can-
didates can become president even if they do not win the popular vote if they
win a majority of the electoral college; and there is a significant gap between
the time of election and when a new president takes office.
Medina points out that these features of the Constitution do not allow for
‘‘on-going public participation’’ through constitutional construction because
they are hard-wired rules. ‘‘It is not clear how,’’ he says, ‘‘these parts of the
Constitution establish their democratic legitimacy.’’38 I do not believe that
these hard-wired parts of the Constitution establish their democratic legitimacy
in isolation. Rather, they are deemed legitimate only as part of a larger frame-
work, and the question is whether the American people accept that framework
as their plan for politics.
I should note that some, but not all, of these hard-wired features allow for
legislative workarounds that are forms of constitutional construction.39 For ex-
ample, Americans could move to popular election of the president if Congress
ratified a state compact (permitted under the Compact Clause). Under this
compact, states would agree to pledge their electoral votes to whoever wins
the national popular vote. If enough states join the compact, the electoral col-
lege majority will always go to the candidate who receives the most votes.40
This example demonstrates that when we look at the Constitution as a
whole, many parts of the Constitution that appear to be fixed are actually
37 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
38 Medina, supra note 31, at 8.
39 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
40 For one such proposal, see National Popular Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/. This solution is
not perfect because the winning candidate may receive only a plurality of the popular vote, and not an absolute
majority. It would take more work to organize an ‘‘instant runoff’’ ballot that would always produce a majority.
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default rules that can be changed through ordinary legislation. However, not all
hard-wired features can successfully be altered in this way; and in some cases,
even if the changes were technically feasible they would be politically impos-
sible in practice.41 Therefore the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution-in-
practice depends on whether Americans are willing to accept the entire pack-
age—including those features that can be changed through construction and
those that can be changed only through Article V amendment or a new con-
stitutional convention.
But need it be an all-or-nothing choice? Couldn’t a country simply abandon
parts of its constitution without abandoning the whole? Surely this has
happened many times before. My point, however, is that abandonment is
not interpretation or construction. To the extent that the change is democrat-
ically legitimate, it is a new exercise of constituent power. This exercise of
constituent power may not fit within the constitution’s amendment process,
but that does not mean that it therefore must be an interpretation or a con-
struction of the Constitution. It might be an extra-constitutional change that
has been ratified by the public.42
Imagine that a country’s constitution has fixed term limits for the presi-
dency; the president keeps running for new terms in defiance of the rules,
and the populace keeps electing him or her. I do not doubt that this sequence
of events may have altered the country’s basic law and made the term limits
provision a dead letter, but I would not say that this event was merely an
interpretation or construction of the constitution. That is so even if we stipu-
late that the result is democratically legitimate. Just as interpretive fidelity does
not guarantee democratic legitimacy, democratic legitimacy does not guarantee
interpretive fidelity. And, of course, some forms of partial abandonment may
not even be democratically legitimate. Imagine a military coup in which the
generals keep most of the constitution in place but simply ignore the rules for
elections.
Medina also argues that framework originalism may ‘‘fail[] to satisfy a ‘thick’
norm of procedural legitimacy’’ because it delegates too much to later gener-
ations.43 Although Medina agrees that ‘‘the framers and adopters of the
Constitution may delegate powers to others,’’44 he believes that merely stating
a set of basic constitutional principles in a Bill of Rights ‘‘is insufficient to gain
[a constitution] procedural legitimacy,’’ because ‘‘[s]uch a constitution does not
reflect substantial moral choices of the People.’’45
41 For example, Mark Tushnet has pointed out to me that one could effectively do an end-run around the
Senate’s malapportionment if the Senate were to adopt an internal rule under Article I, section 5, clause 2, that it
approved all legislation passed by the House. But it is unlikely that Senators would ever agree to a rule that
rendered them politically powerless.
42 This is Bruce Ackerman’s account of both the 14th Amendment and the New Deal. See supra note 7.
43 Medina, supra note 31, at 9.
44 Id. at 10.
45 Id.
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I do not see why this is so. When a constitution provides that speech, press,
petition, and assembly are protected, it reflects a substantial moral choice; after
all, the constitution is protecting speech, and not golf, cooking, or stamp col-
lecting. Perhaps more importantly, Medina’s argument seems to prove too
much. Constitutions around the world include vague and abstract guarantees
of rights that inevitably delegate application to the future. Surely it cannot be
the case that all of these constitutions and constitutional provisions lack pro-
cedural legitimacy. I believe that Medina’s real point, which I agree with, is that
a constitution like America’s has democratic legitimacy today not merely be-
cause its initial adoption satisfied some basic test of procedural legitimacy, but
because its provisions are embedded in a constitutional system that possesses
sufficient sociological and moral legitimacy.46
Original meaning and contemporary construction
Living Originalism’s theory of original meaning is ‘‘thin.’’ It includes the original
semantic meaning of the Constitution’s words (including any generally recog-
nized terms of art) and the adopters’ choice of rules, standards, or principles.
But it does not include the adopters’ original expected applications—how the
adopters would have applied the text to specific questions, or how the adopters
would have formulated the relevant principles of decision. Interpreters may
look to this evidence as a resource when they construct present-day doctrines
and practices that implement the Constitution, but they are not required to
accept it.
Why are original expected applications not part of original meaning? Re’em
Segev argues that because ‘‘the meaning that a person attributes to a text is a
descriptive phenomenon,’’47 ‘‘the law, and particularly the original meaning of
the constitutional text, is [also] a descriptive phenomenon,’’ not a normative
one, and therefore ‘‘should be determined in light of an empirical investiga-
tion.’’48 The fact that parts of the text are stated in abstract or vague terms,
Segev maintains, does not mean that the adopters intended to delegate the
meaning of those terms to future generations.49 If we want to know what
‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ meant to the adopters in 1868, the best evidence
is what people thought the text would do in practice.
It is possible, Segev concedes, that with respect to some of the provisions in
the Constitution, the adopters did not think that their expectations and as-
sumptions were controlling, but instead meant to delegate constitutional con-
struction to future generations. But ‘‘it does not seem plausible that the
common meaning of all the constitutional standards and principles in the
46 Id.
47 Id. at 4.
48 Segev, supra note 1, at 38.
49 Id. at 4–5.
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United States Constitution include only a very thin normative idea without any
additional, more specific content.’’50 Therefore, Segev argues, unless there is
strong evidence to the contrary, the original meaning of the text should include
the specific content intended by the adopters—the kinds of cases and situations
to which they believed the text would apply or not apply, and their expectations
about what the text would accomplish in practice.
I disagree. The Constitution becomes law because of an act of popular sov-
ereignty; therefore the proper inquiry is the legal effect of this act. The legal
meaning of an act of popular sovereignty is not meaning per se but meaning for
a particular purpose—the purpose of creating a constitution. Only some elem-
ents of meaning become part of binding law; others do not. Legal meaning is
only a subset of communicative meaning.
The concept of ‘‘meaning’’ itself has many meanings. It might refer to the
semantic content of the words in a sentence, or ‘‘meaning’’ might refer to the
purposes, intentions, expectations, or cultural associations held by a person
who utters a sentence or who understands a sentence. When a constitutional
provision is adopted, the enacted text becomes law, but all of the hopes, in-
tentions, expectations, and cultural associations of the adopters do not become
law, even if they were part of the original speakers’ meaning.51 (Note that it is
commonplace to ascribe purposes to a statute or to a text, but this is not the
same thing as saying that the psychological states of adopters are part of the
law.) To be sure, these various elements of meaning may be important as aids
for present-day constitutional construction, but they are not part of the frame-
work and we do not have to employ them.
So even if Segev is correct that what a speaker meant is a descriptive ques-
tion and subject to empirical investigation, it does not follow that all aspects of
that meaning are part of the law. The aspects of meaning that become law
depend on the nature of the practice in which we are engaged, and on the
purposes of a constitution.52 Thus, my thin account of original meaning fol-
lows not simply from the nature of language or communication but from my
view that a constitution is a certain kind of plan for politics that contains a
particular economy of delegation and constraint.
The psychological beliefs and expectations of the adopters are not part of the
plan, although they could have been written into the plan. For example, the
Eighth Amendment could have said: ‘‘Cruel and unusual punishments as
understood at the time of this Constitution shall not be inflicted.’’ But the
text does not say this, and reading the text as if it does say this actually
alters the plan by changing its interpretive economy. It attempts to turn
50 Id.
51 See also Barnett, supra note 25, at 45–7.
52 Andrei Marmor has made a similar point. Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional
Interpretation, __ FORDHAM L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013).
Must we be Faithful to Original Meaning? 71
standards and principles into something more like rules in order to avoid re-
sponsibility for present-day judgements.
Segev might still object: the semantic meaning of ‘‘equal protection of the
laws’’ might be far narrower than it appears to us today. We cannot assume
that just because the text looks abstract and general to us that it looked that
way to ordinary speakers of the English language in 1868, when the 14th
Amendment was adopted. This aspect of original meaning is a matter of
social fact, and it is subject to empirical investigation. The commonly under-
stood semantic meaning of the phrase ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ in 1868
might have referred only to racial equality, or equality based on race or sex, but
not equality with respect to any other issue. Or, as mentioned above, the text
might refer only to denials of equal treatment by the executive branch, but not
by the legislative or judicial branches.
If this is Segev’s objection, it has a great deal of merit. Some parts of the
Constitution are terms of art; they might look abstract or general to laymen
today but the original meaning may be different. In the same way, some of the
Constitution’s seemingly abstract principles and vague standards might turn
out to have had a generally accepted semantic meaning far narrower than we
would assume today; we cannot know this for certain until we do some inves-
tigation. Moreover, evidence of how people used the words and how they
expected these words would apply to particular situations might be helpful in
deciding this question, even given the distinction between original meaning and
original expected applications.
My point, however, is that most of the Constitution does not consist of
generally recognized terms of art or of words with narrow meanings that
would seem unusual to us today. With very few exceptions the words that
constitute its abstract principles and vague standards mean today what they
meant at the time of their adoption. This is an historical, not a philosophical
claim, and with respect to any particular clause it can be proven wrong given
sufficient evidence to the contrary. But for most of the clauses that American
constitutional lawyers argue about most of the time, the ordinary (and con-
temporary) meaning is also the original meaning. For example, as I argue in
Living Originalism, in 1868 ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ was not a term of art
specifically limited to race—the choice of general language was deliberate. In
addition, in 1868 ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ was not a generally recognized
term of art that referred only to executive action but not to legislation.53
Yet, Segev, might ask, why would a constitution use abstract or general prin-
ciples or standards that delegate their implementation and construction to
future generations? Constitutional norms, like legal norms generally, Segev
53 See Balkin, supra note 8, at 25–6, 220–1.
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argues, are ‘‘descriptive,’’ not ‘‘normative’’; the view that constitutional norms
are ‘‘essentially normative rather than descriptive . . . seems odd in general and
it is incompatible with Balkin’s assumption that the (constitutional) law is
determined in light of its original meaning.’’54
I am not quite sure what Segev means by the claim that legal norms are not
normative, but I assume he means merely that the content of the law is a social
fact and therefore subject to empirical investigation. In any case, that claim is
not a problem for my argument. There is no jurisprudential difficulty in legal
norms delegating implementation and construction to others. It happens all the
time through the adopters’ choice of language. Moreover, that is how most
constitutions are written. There is nothing odd about a constitution that dele-
gates the implementation of legal norms to future generations, unless one
thinks that virtually all constitutions are odd.
In a constitutional plan, adopters can use language in two different ways.
The language of a constitution can create institutions and it can create norms.
Most constitutions do both. The American Constitution, for example, creates
different branches of government that are put in competition with each other;
it also contains legal norms.
Generally speaking, most constitutions have a combination of rules, stand-
ards, and principles. They can be specific or general; and they can be abstract
or concrete, clear or vague. Rules require comparatively little practical reason-
ing to apply and therefore tend to delegate little to future generations.
Standards and principles, on the other hand, normally require considerable
practical reasoning to apply, and therefore tend to delegate a great deal of
application to future generations. The more abstract or vague the standard
or the principle, the more delegation is required.
These aspects of constitutional language are neither unusual nor accidental.
They are familiar features of a basic law that has to get politics up and running,
help keep politics stable, and allow the political system to last for an indefinite
length of time, structuring the political decisions of people who will be born
into very different circumstances in the future. Because adopters are not all-
knowing, they must leave something to be worked out by future generations.
Therefore they must choose an economy of delegation and constraint. They do
this through their choice of constitutional language: the kinds of institutions
they create, and their choice of legal norms.
For this reason, I argue that a commitment to the text’s original meaning
also includes a commitment to the adopters’ choice of rules, standards, and
principles. In this limited respect, we care about what the adopters intended.
But that is because we want to understand the interpretive economy they
created through their choice of language.
54 Segev, supra note 1, at 39.
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Barak Medina’s essay elaborates on this point. He distinguishes between the
kinds of sources we should use to ‘‘identify[] the Constitution’s original frame-
work’’ and the kinds of ‘‘sources that are relevant for interpreting the
Constitution’’ once we understand the framework.55 To understand the frame-
work, we might need to know what kinds of legal norms the adopters put in the
plan: whether they sought to delegate certain decisions to future generations,
or instead sought to impose hard-wired solutions that would be difficult to get
around. On the other hand, once we know what the basic framework is, con-
stitutional construction may use historical sources quite differently. We might
look to the intentions and expectations of the framers as resources that justify
our present-day constructions.56
Original meaning and linguistic context
Lawrence Solum’s paper points out that even a thin conception of original
meaning like mine must include more than purely semantic content; it must
also take into account pragmatic elements of language. When we communicate
with others, we rely not only on the generally accepted semantic meanings of
our works, but also on the context of our utterance. Thus, much of what we
mean when we speak to other people is not directly stated in the words we use;
rather, the audience infers our meaning from background context.
How does background context affect our judgements of what is in the con-
stitutional framework and what is a matter of constitutional construction?
Consider the following examples. In Article I, section 1 the Constitution
says that the ‘‘Congress of the United States . . . shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.’’ Later on in the document it refers to the ‘‘Senate’’
without specifying that it is part of Congress. Does fidelity to original meaning
require that the later appearances of the word in the text refer to the same US
Senate, or could they refer to any Senate—for example, the Roman Senate?
The Constitution uses numbers. Does fidelity to the original meaning require
that these numbers be in base 10 or could we permissibly interpret them to be
in base 12? The Constitution refers to dates, months, and years. For purposes
55 Medina, supra note 31, at 12. I make a similar distinction in Living Originalism. Balkin, supra note 8, at
46–9.
56 Medina argues that the constitutional framework should also include certain structural elements: his ex-
amples are an ‘‘override clause,’’ which allows the legislature to override court decisions, and a ‘‘limitation
clause,’’ which ‘‘authorizes the legislature to infringe liberties under a certain set of conditions.’’ Medina,
supra note 31, at 10. If, as in some constitutions, these features are actually part of the constitutional text,
there should be no doubt that they are part of the framework. In any case, nothing in my argument is committed
to what John Hart Ely once called a ‘‘clause-bound interpretivism.’’ JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11, 12–13, 88 & n.* (1980). Quite the contrary, I assume that interpreters should try
to understand how the different parts of a constitution work together. More interesting examples are structural
principles that are not explicitly stated in the text but that are presumed by the interaction of the Constitution’s
different parts, like the separation of powers and federalism. Structural principles are technically constitutional
constructions that we infer from the text. But some of them are so essential to the operation of the framework
that we would seriously misunderstand the Constitution if we neglected them.
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of original meaning, is the relevant calendar the Gregorian calendar, or can the
Constitution be fairly interpreted to refer to the Jewish lunar calendar, or to
any other calendar?
Most people, I suspect, would argue that later references to the Senate refer
to the US Senate, that the numbers in the Constitution are in base 10, and that
calendar dates refer to the Gregorian calendar. They would infer these under-
standings from background context and consider them to be part of the
original meaning.
But the adopters also probably had unspoken beliefs about how the words of
the text would be applied in concrete situations. Solum calls these application
beliefs. For example, most people in 1791, if asked, might have assumed that
hanging was not cruel or unusual punishment, and most people in 1868 would
probably have assumed that the new Equal Protection Clause did not protect
homosexuals from discrimination.
As noted above, I deny that widely held beliefs at the time of adoption about
how the text should be applied are part of the framework, because I distinguish
between original expected applications and original meaning. But couldn’t
those beliefs about application also be part of the background context in
which the Constitution’s text was communicated to the public? And if they
are not, then does this mean that the calendar and the number system are not
part of original meaning either?
Not necessarily. We must infer some content that is not directly stated from
background context in order for the Constitution to function properly as a plan
or framework. But not all inferences from background context are either
necessary or appropriate for this purpose.
How do we decide what inferences from background context are needed for
the plan to work? Solum mentions Ryan Williams’ test: ‘‘whether a reasonable
member of the ratifying public at the time of enactment would have recognized
the implied content as following obviously and noncontroversially from the
choice of the particular language used in the provision and the relevant back-
ground context.’’57
That is a good start, but obviousness and lack of controversy by themselves
are not sufficient. Some applications of an abstract text might be obvious and
noncontroversial at the time of adoption, but it does not follow that these
applications are part of the framework. For example, a person in 1791 might
have thought it obvious and uncontroversial that the first amendment did not
protect negligently false statements that defame public officials, sexually expli-
cit materials, public swearing, or some kinds of commercial advertisements.
A person in 1868 might have thought it obvious and uncontroversial that the
new equal protection clause did not make unconstitutional common-law
coverture rules that denied married women almost all of their common-law
57 Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 544 (2011).
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rights. The distinction between original meaning and original expected appli-
cations presupposes that some applications of a principle that are unthinkable
or ‘‘off-the-wall’’ at one point in history might later become plausible or
‘‘on-the-wall’’ at another.58 When adopters use standards and principles, they
are leaving judgements about how to apply the text to later generations even
though they believe that some applications are obvious and noncontroversial,
and that others are ‘‘off-the-wall.’’59
In addition, the test cannot be what a member of the adopting public actu-
ally believed or assumed, or what they would believe or assume if we could
magically whisk them to the present and ask them. When we infer meaning
from context, what we infer may not consciously have been in the speaker’s
mind. Thus, when we use background context to infer original meaning, we
ascribe certain beliefs and intentions to the adopters regardless of their actual
understandings and their actual psychological states. In many cases the adop-
ters might never have thought of a particular question that we raise today. For
example, none of the adopters might have ever heard of base-12 arithmetic,
and if we posed the question to them, they might not understand what we were
talking about.
A better approach is to start with the premises of framework originalism. A
constitution is a plan for politics that employs a combination of constraints and
delegations to future generations. This plan is the constitution, not the beliefs
of its adopters. To be faithful to the plan we must try to understand the plan’s
particular economy of delegation and constraint. Background context may be
necessary to make inferences about this economy, even when it is not fully or
explicitly stated in the text.
What kinds of content should we infer? We should ask whether it makes
sense for us to ascribe to the adopters the purpose of delegating a particular
issue to be worked out in the future, even though the adopters might have had
application beliefs about the issue in question. If it does not make sense to
ascribe a purpose to delegate a question to the future, then we should infer that
this content is part of the framework.
Is it reasonable for us to think that the base system for interpreting numbers
listed in the Constitution would have to be worked out later on? Is it
58 On the concepts of ‘‘off-the-wall’’ and ‘‘on-the-wall, see Balkin, supra note 24, at 177–82.
59 Jed Rubenfeld argues that the paradigmatic cases involving individual rights or national powers in which the
adopters expected the text would apply are binding on later generations because they are part of our constitu-
tional commitments. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15 (Harvard University Press 2005). In contrast,
situations in which the adopters did not expect that a right or power would extend are by definition not com-
mitments and are therefore not binding. I regard paradigmatic cases as particularly persuasive constructions but
do not treat them as part of the framework. In Rubenfeld’s approach, the scope of federal rights and powers can
only increase from original expected applications. This approach explains much of current constitutional practice
as a descriptive matter, but that is largely because of the way the American Constitution has developed since the
New Deal and the creation of the National Security State. Rubenfeld’s theory does not explain how the framers
could ever have committed themselves to limited federal or presidential powers. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 346
n. 23.
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reasonable for us to believe that what the word ‘‘Senate’’ referred to was to be
left to the judgement of later interpreters? In neither case would this be a
plausible assumption. Therefore we should infer the relevant content from
background context and treat it as part of the original meaning. In contrast,
it is entirely plausible that adopters might delegate to later generations how to
apply abstract phrases like ‘‘equal protection’’ or ‘‘freedom of speech’’ even if
they thought that some questions of application were obvious and noncontro-
versial in their own day.60
This approach to background context solves some problems, but I am quite
sure that it does not solve all of them. I expect that there is much more
thinking to be done about what kinds of inferences from background context
should form part of the basic framework in a theory of framework originalism.
Moreover, once we decide that a particular background context is part of ori-
ginal meaning, applying it to new circumstances may sometimes create unex-
pected difficulties. For example, someday the USA might move to a different
calendar than the Gregorian calendar. If that were to happen, interpreters
would have to figure out how to translate references to dates and times in
the Constitution—for example, when the president’s term starts and ends—
in terms of the new calendar. There might be multiple ways of performing the
translation, based on what we understand the point of the text to be. That
would make the translation a question of constitutional construction.
In sum, framework originalism employs background context to infer aspects
of original meaning that are not explicitly stated by the text, but it limits these
inferences to those necessary to make sense of the basic framework and its
economy of delegation and constraint. Therefore its account of original mean-
ing is ‘‘sparse’’ or ‘‘thin.’’61
Solum argues that a constitutional theory’s choice of whether to have a thick
or thin account of original meaning is also a choice about how much to leave to
constitutional construction. That choice, in turn, depends on ‘‘the underlying
justifications for originalism’’ and ‘‘institutional concerns’’ about decision-
making capacities.62 Consider the theory of Living Originalism in terms of
60 Conversely, we may sometimes discover gaps and inconsistencies in the text that the adopters do not appear
to have foreseen. Here background context is important for a different reason. It helps us recognize that there has
been a partial failure of communication. In these cases, we should treat the plan as incomplete and we should
engage in construction to make the best sense of the plan. Akhil Amar offers an example. Article I, section 3 of
the Constitution provides (i) that trials of government officials following impeachment by the House of
Representatives are conducted before the Senate; (ii) that the Vice-President presides over the Senate; and
(iii) that the Chief Justice shall preside in case of impeachment of the President. Suppose the Vice-President
is impeached. Can Vice-Presidents preside over their own trials? Background context should lead us to conclude
that the text is incomplete or has misfired. We may therefore engage in constitutional construction to fill in the
gaps without concluding that we are contradicting the text. Given the long-standing common-law principle that
no person may be a judge in his or her own case, the Senate may provide in its internal rules that the President
Pro Tempore (a Senator), and not the Vice-President, presides at the latter’s trial. See Amar, supra note 24, at
5–7.
61 Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion of Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 17, 31
(2013).
62 Id. at 32.
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these two criteria: (i) the theory’s underlying justifications for framework ori-
ginalism and (ii) how the theory understands the institutional capacities of
various actors in the constitutional system.
I claim that the adopters chose a particular interpretive economy through the
text’s choice of rules, standards, principles, and silences. But we cannot know
precisely what the adopters thought; therefore, as Barak Medina correctly
points out, this is really an ascription of purpose to the adopters rather than
a description of their psychology.63 I justify this ascription of purpose on three
grounds. First, it is the best account of why the text reads the way it does.
Second, it best coheres with the basic problem faced by adopters with limited
knowledge of the future who want to write a constitution designed to last for an
indefinite period of time. Third, it is consistent with common features of con-
stitution writing that we see at different times and places around the world,
including not only the constitutions of other nations but also the 50 American
state constitutions.
There is also a fourth and equally important reason for ascribing these pur-
poses to the adopters. Solum argues that whether a theory of original meaning
is thick or thin depends on what he calls ‘‘the underlying justifications’’ for
originalism. My theory of constitutional interpretation seeks to explain not only
what it means to be faithful to an ancient Constitution, but how the processes
of constitutional change can promote the democratic legitimacy of the political
system over time. That is, my theory justifies originalism and living constitu-
tionalism together; each is crucial to the justification of the other.
Why is this so? The Constitution may continue as law over time because of
rule of law values, but that does not mean that it retains the same degree
of democratic legitimacy over time. Although the initial adoption of the
Constitution and subsequent amendments may be legitimate as an act of popu-
lar sovereignty, their democratic warrant fades over time as the adopting gen-
eration passes away and is replaced by generations who had no say in the
creation or adoption of the constitutional text. The text may be no less law
as time passes, but it may become less democratically legitimate law.64
‘‘We the People of the United States’’ today are not the same human beings
as the ‘‘We the People’’ who adopted most of the Constitution’s text. In fact,
most of the present generation may not even be related to the adopting gen-
eration. This feature of a long-lived constitution creates a democratic deficit,
because the people who live under the Constitution cannot say that they or
their elected representatives created it as law. The democratic deficit increases
over time, attenuating the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.
The best response to this problem is to view We the People of the United
States as a trans-generational subject, consisting of the successive groups of
63 See Medina, supra note 31, at 7.
64 Barak Medina makes a similar point. Medina, supra note 31, at 8.
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individuals who inhabit the same nation, and to treat the Constitution as a
trans-generational project, in which each generation contributes its part. But if
this answer is to be more than a convenient fiction, each generation must have
a hand in building out the Constitution they live under. The Constitution-in-
practice must be produced over time by many different people living at differ-
ent times; it must become the work of many generations, not merely the
adopting generation. This means that the constituent or constitution-making
power of the people must be exercised not only at the comparatively rare mo-
ments of initial adoption and amendment, but continually in constitutional
development. If the Constitution is to retain its democratic legitimacy, the
initial act of popular sovereignty and the rule of law are not sufficient.
Democratic legitimacy must flow from a source that is continually refreshed.
That source is constitutional construction, which, in the long run, is responsive
to democratic processes, as described in Chapters 13 and 14 of Living
Originalism.
Solum also argues that the choice of a thick or a thin theory of original
meaning depends on institutional concerns about who is best equipped to
make decisions about constitutional meaning and application. In his essay,
Solum focuses primarily on the institutional capacity of judges. I focus instead
on the institutional capacity of generations.
The adopting generation cannot foresee everything that will happen in pol-
itical life; it cannot predict how technology, foreign affairs, demographics, and
social change will drastically alter the world it imagines and wreak havoc on its
best-laid plans. Because human capacities for knowing the future are limited,
the adopting generation must rely on the work of subsequent generations in
order to make the constitutional project a success over time. And because it
lacks the institutional capacity to create a complete constitution on its own, the
adopting generation needs the assistance of many people devoted to the project
who are strewn throughout time.
The adopting generation cannot create a complete constitution—that is the
hope and the folly of what I call ‘‘skyscraper originalism.’’65 What the adopting
generation can do, however, is to structure and channel the political choices of
later generations in the hope that these people will become attached to the
project and work to make it succeed. A trans-generational project, in short,
must make the most of each generation’s limited capacities to understand the
challenges of the future, and it must rely on the contributions of each succeed-
ing generation. Later generations may fail us; that is why legitimacy also
depends on constitutional faith.
If the constitutional constructions of successive generations give the
Constitution its continuing democratic legitimacy, and if the efforts of
65 Balkin, supra note 8, at 21–2 (defining skyscraper originalism as the view that at the time of initial adoption
the Constitution is ‘‘more or less a finished project, albeit always subject to Article V amendment.’’)
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successive generations are necessary to compensate for the limited institutional
capacity of any single generation, then the best account of original meaning is a
thin theory. The US Constitution is not only among the most long-lived in
history, it is also among the most difficult to amend in the world. A theory of
original meaning that is too thick will exacerbate the democratic deficit of a
long-lived constitution, and it will undermine democratic legitimacy as time
goes on. A thick account of original meaning will also fail to economize on the
collective wisdom of successive generations; it will make far less use of the
institutional capacities of later generations to adapt government to techno-
logical, social, and economic change, and to new crises and unexpected needs.
The problems created by the increasing democratic deficit of originalism
over time and by the limited institutional capacity of adopters are best
solved by a thin theory of original meaning, which leaves ample room for
constitutional construction. Constitutional construction, in turn, occurs
through the processes of living constitutionalism. That is why I argue that
framework originalism and living constitutionalism are not opposed but mutu-
ally dependent; they are two sides of the same coin.
Living Originalism and halakhic development
I close with a few remarks about Gideon Sapir’s remarkable tour de force in
which he compares the argument of Living Originalism with different positions
about interpretation in the halakhic tradition.66 I shall work in the opposite
direction, trying to find analogies between the different positions that Sapir
describes and positions taken by American constitutional scholars about how to
interpret the US Constitution.
At the outset, however, I should emphasize that however interesting these
comparisons can be, there is an important difference between the Torah and
the Constitution. According to Jewish tradition, the author of the Torah is
God. Moses merely conveyed God’s message, and the judges, prophets, and
sages who followed attempted to represent God’s will. The authors of the
American Constitution, in contrast, are human beings representing the
American people at a particular point in time. They are flawed, imperfect,
and creatures of a particular moment. To be sure, Americans, in a fit of pat-
riotic excess, sometimes ascribe god-like powers to the framers, and a few
conservative Christians have even suggested that the Constitution, like the
Bible, is divinely inspired. But this is not the majority view; most Americans
realize that even if most of the founders were enlightened individuals, they were
still human beings with moral failings and limited vision. Some of the founders
owned slaves, many of them did not believe in the equality of women, and
so on.
66 Gideon Sapir, Living Originalism – The Jewish Version, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2013).
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This distinction between the Torah and the Constitution is important when
we criticize the law as it has been handed down to us. If a particular halakhic
interpretation is unjust or illogical, it may be because later interpreters have
erred in some way, but it cannot be because God erred. If the Constitution is
unjust or illogical, it may be because subsequent interpretations are mistakes.
But it may also be because the original plan was defective, or came to be so
over time.
Sapir frames the question of interpretive theory in a particularly interesting
way. Relying on the fact that God is perfect and infallible, he asks how it is
possible that there could ever be a dispute about the Torah, given that the
entire law, both written and oral, was given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai
and passed down by Moses to generations of sages.67 Within the halakhic
tradition, several explanations have been offered for how disagreement could
be possible. Each has parallels in American debates about the proper interpret-
ation of the Constitution. While the Talmudists asked how disagreement was
possible, Americans have asked how interpretive change is possible and to what
extent this change can be legitimate. The two ideas are related. If there can be
genuine disagreement about the law, then presumably more than one position
might be adopted reasonably and in good faith. And if more than one position
may be adopted, this creates the possibility of legitimate change in the accepted
interpretation, either of the Torah or of the Constitution.
The first position, which Sapir ascribes to Maimonides, regards disagreement
as a sign of past errors or failings, which, unfortunately, are now quite difficult
to correct. Disagreement about proper halakhic interpretation comes from
‘‘moral failure—Torah sages . . . did not serve their teachers sufficiently, and
are therefore unable to effectively use the tools of interpretation to uncover
the correct explanation.’’68 This approach is closest to the first generation of
originalists, such as Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and Antonin Scalia. They
argued that contemporary constitutional scholars had forgotten the original
intentions or the original meaning of the framers and had therefore strayed
from the correct path. Bork even called his book on originalism The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law.69 Such failings led to illegitimate
judicial decisions; hence Berger’s book on the 14th Amendment was entitled
Government by Judiciary.70 In a famous law review article, Scalia described
originalism as ‘‘the lesser evil,’’71 and explained that even if judges were not
perfect historians, they had a duty to try their best to ascertain original mean-
ing. Sometimes, Scalia argued, because judges in the past have strayed so far
67 Id. at 4. See also Yaakov Elman, R. Zadok Hakohen on the History Of Halakha, 21 TRADITION 1–26 (1985)
(tracing the history of the problem).
68 Sapir, supra note 66, at 5
69 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
70 RAOUL BERGER: GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
71 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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from original meaning, we will be stuck with nonoriginalist interpretations
because people have come to rely on them. But a true originalist should
refuse to go any further down the path of error. We should acknowledge that
these decisions are mistakes and not make them worse than they already are.
The second position, ascribed to R. Yannai, explains interpretive disagree-
ment, and therefore interpretive change, quite differently. R. Yannai argued
that God created an abundance of possible meanings for the Torah when he
gave it to Moses on Mount Sinai, so that later generations are free to choose
among them. Thus, Sapir explains, ‘‘[t]he interpreter is not required to ascer-
tain the intent hidden in the text because even at the time it was given the text
did not have a single intent. The lawmaker’s intent does not dictate the truth of
the interpretation because no clear intent ever existed.’’72 This is the view of
many nonoriginalists today. It is similar to the position of Paul Brest, the critic
of the philosophy of original understanding who first coined the term ‘‘origin-
alism.’’73 Among Brest’s many criticisms of originalism was that the people
who framed and ratified the Constitution would likely have many different
intentions, or no position on some issues, so that there was not a single con-
trolling intention. Therefore, Brest argued, the search for original intention is
‘‘misconceived.’’74 There is, however, a difference between the two positions:
R. Yannai assumes that later interpreters may pick from among the many
possible meanings that God in his infinite wisdom has provided;75 nonorigin-
alists like Brest, in contrast, argue that they are free to choose constructions
that none of the adopters would have found acceptable.
The third position, which Sapir finds offered by various Talmudic authori-
ties, is that, with respect to certain (but not all) questions, ‘‘God merely es-
tablished principles and left us the authority to determine the details . . . . The
phrase used in all these passages, which helps identify them, is ‘Scripture
handed it over to the Sages.’ ’’76 This approach is perhaps closest to the pos-
ition of some originalists about presidential power; as with the Talmudic
theory, it applies only to some questions of constitutional interpretation.
According to this view, the scope of executive power and its relationship to
the power of Congress evolves through practice, which, in turn establishes
certain precedents that should guide later political actors.77
72 Sapir, supra note 66, at 6.
73 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212–13, 220–1
(1980); see also Dworkin, supra note 23, at 315–22.
74 Id., at 204.
75 Cf. Babylonian Talmud Eruvin 13b, in which a heavenly voice declares that the views of the schools of
Hillel and Shammai are both acknowledged to be ‘‘the words of the living God,’’ but Hillel’s position becomes
the law.
76 Sapir, supra note 66, at 7.
77 See, eg, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 411 (2012) (canvassing current theories of historical practice and offering a new theory of when and how
past precedents should affect the separation of powers).
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The fourth approach, which Sapir identifies with the famous story of the
Oven of Akhnai, is that even if God intends that the law be applied in one way,
the authority to interpret and expound the law has been given to the Sages
once it leaves God’s hands. Therefore the Sages may choose a different pos-
ition that binds them and all future generations.78 This position obviously has
affinities to nonoriginalist views which do not consider the adopters’ views as
binding on later generations, but may regard precedents as binding. However, a
more interesting analogy—although not precisely identical—is to the views of
James Madison and other founders. They argued that with respect to certain
disputed constitutional questions, the meaning of the text could be ‘‘liqui-
dated’’ by subsequent practice, which would thereafter settle the issue.79
A good example of how original meaning might be liquidated according to
Madison’s views is Congress’s power to charter a national bank by creating a
corporation. In the 1790s Madison—who can lay as great a claim as any to
being a primary drafter of the US Constitution—took the position that such a
bank was unconstitutional. However, despite his objections, Congress passed a
bill creating the First Bank of the United States, which was signed by George
Washington. Authorization for the First Bank expired, and during the War of
1812, the federal government was greatly hampered by having to rely on state
banks for loans to finance the war.80 In 1815, during Madison’s second term as
president, he continued to oppose the creation of a second bank on policy
grounds, but he now argued that it was settled that Congress had the consti-
tutional power to create such a bank. And a year later, in 1816, he signed a bill
authorizing a second bank.81 According to Madison’s theory of interpretation,
the original meaning of the Constitution had been liquidated by practice.82
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the bank
in the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland.83 Note that under Madison’s
theory, later generations are also bound by the liquidated meaning. But this
78 Sapir, supra note 66, at 8. See Babylonian Talmud Bava Metzia 59b.
79 See The Federalist 37 (Madison) (‘‘All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed
on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.’’); see also Letter
from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (September 2, 1819), reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (1865) (‘‘It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution,
that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily
used in such a charter; more especially those which divide legislation between the general and local governments;
and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.’’).
80 See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed.
2006); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 227–33
(1957).
81 See Brest et al., supra note 80, at 37; Hammond, supra note 80, at 233.
82 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 U. VA. L. REV. 1, 11–14, n. 33
(2001). Madison seems to have believed that liquidation could only allow subsequent interpreters to choose from
among a set of plausible constructions; it did not allow them to repeal or alter the existing law. Id. at 13.
83 17 U.S. 316 (1819) Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion also argued that the constitutionality of the bank
had been settled by practice. Id. at 401–2.
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seems not to have occurred. The Jacksonian Democrats who dominated pol-
itics in the antebellum period disagreed with Madison’s acquiescence and re-
jected the decision in McCulloch. President Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill
renewing the second bank on constitutional grounds, and eventually shut the
bank down.84
The fifth and final position, which Sapir identifies with the Orthodox Rabbi
Moshe Shmuel Glasner (also known as the Dor Revi’i, after his most famous
book). Glasner’s view is that the Oral Torah (Torah she-be’al peh) has a different
function than the Written Torah (Torah she-bichtav). The Oral Law was de-
signed to be transmitted by word of mouth from generation to generation. It
was not to be written down so as ‘‘not to tie the hands of the sages of every
generation from interpreting Scripture according to their understanding.’’85
The Torah and its authority as God’s law remain eternal precisely because of
an oral tradition’s inherent possibilities for transformation over time, ‘‘for the
changes in the generations and their opinions, situation and material and moral
condition require[] changes in their laws, decrees and improvements.’’86
Sapir identifies Glasner’s position with the argument in Living Originalism. I
think that he is correct to do so. What is distinctive about this position is that it
treats the Written Torah differently from the Oral Torah, and views the two as
performing complementary functions. The Written Torah does not change, but
its interpretation and application may change, and an important site of this
change is the evolution of the views that constitute the Oral Torah.
As the Talmud itself (ironically) explains, the oral law was not supposed to
be written down.87 Nevertheless, for reasons of historical urgency, and in order
to secure the survival of the Jewish people in the Diaspora, the Oral Torah had
to be recorded. This process of compilation began a period of intense intellec-
tual creativity and disputation that eventually produced the Talmud. But once
the Talmud was completed, later commentators—who were also persons of
great intelligence—felt bound to accept the opinions of the Talmudic sages
as correct representations of the Oral tradition. That which was supposed
always to be in flux became increasingly fixed and hardened.
To be sure, the abbreviated, dialectical, and sometimes obscure discussion of
legal points in the Talmud still left plenty for later commentators to argue
about. Perhaps for this reason we should even be grateful that the Talmud is
84 See Brest et al., supra note 80, at 74–9.
85 Sapir, supra note 66, at 11. See Yaakov Elman, Rabbi Moses Samuel Glasner: The Oral Torah, 25 TRADITION
63–9 (1991), available at <http://www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4/elman.html>.
86 Sapir, supra note 66, at 11.
87 Babylonian Talmud Temurah 14b; see also Babylonian Talmud Gittin 60b. Given the actual history of
Talmudic development, one must take these prohibitions with a grain of salt. See H. L. STRACK AND GÜNTER
STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH 31–4 (Markus Bockmuehl, trans., 2d. ed. 1996) (‘‘the
doctrine of the oral Torah in rabbinic times did not result in a prohibition of writing.’’).
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sometimes complicated, multivocal, gnomic, and even enigmatic. For the same
reason, perhaps we should also be grateful that there is both a Babylonian and
a Jerusalem Talmud! If a distinctly oral tradition is to be consolidated into
writing, then perhaps it is best that the writing have gaps, ambiguities, incon-
sistencies and multiple positions for later thinkers to work with.
Nevertheless, the attempt to codify the Oral Torah through writing neces-
sarily marked a diminution in the potential creativity of the Oral Law.88 The
Oral Law’s original function—to serve as a wellspring of change through a
tradition of reasoned argument about how to apply timeless principles to chan-
ging circumstances—was inevitably circumscribed.89
Even so, the best exemplars of the Jewish tradition, I would argue, have
perpetually sought to recapture the spirit of the original division of labor be-
tween the Written and Oral Torah. They have done so through their creative
use of the halakhic tradition.
Ideally, then, we should seek to treat the writings of the Sages as we would
an oral tradition—one that can evolve through reasoned disputation, even if
parts of it have been committed to writing. That means, among other things,
that we should honor the Sages but not take them as the final word. The
Jewish tradition contains many suggestions to this effect, but this is not, how-
ever, the standard view of Orthodox Judaism today. In general the older the
opinion or commentary, the more authoritative it is.90 That is why Sapir must
search far and wide in the Orthodox world to find a position like Glasner’s. He
notes, however, that this approach has found a home in some elements of
Conservative Judaism.91
According to tradition, Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi and his successors began to
compile the Oral Law because they feared that the Jewish people in the
Disaspora would forget the law unless it was written down. Now one might
seek to compile the oral tradition for two reasons. The first is to preserve the
wisdom and the resources of the past so that they could be used by future
generations; the second is to provide a univocal account of the divine law. The
second reason is inconsistent with Glasner’s position, but the first is not. A
living tradition needs memory and resources to work with, even if it changes
over time.
88 As Sapir explains, this is also Glasner’s view. Sapir, supra note 66, at 11, n. 28; Elman, supra note 85. In
contrast, Jacques Derrida’s has famously argued that many of the strengths and weaknesses commonly associated
with oral communication are also true of writing, and vice versa. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976).
Thus, Derrida might suggest that a system of continuous writing and interpretation can also provide ample
opportunity for creativity.
89 Elman, supra note 85.
90 See Sapir, supra note 66, at 9–11. This has become so in practice despite the principle of hilkheta ke-vatra’ei
(the law is according to the later scholars).
91 Sapir, supra note 66, at 10–11. One might also point to Rabbi David Hartman’s liberal Orthodox Judaism.
See DAVID HARTMAN, A HEART OF MANY ROOMS: CELEBRATING THE MANY VOICES WITHIN JUDAISM 50 (1999);
DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: The INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN TRADITIONAL JUDAISM 36 (1995).
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Which reason best explains why the oral tradition was committed to writing?
If the Sages sought to produce a single voice expounding the law, they failed
miserably. The Talmud is embedded in and encourages a culture of dialectic
and disputation. Whether the Talmud is the cause of this culture, or whether
this culture has shaped the way the Talmud has been received, it is impossible
to say. In any case, it is better to understand the task of the Sages not as setting
forth a single true answer for all generations, but as preserving memory and
bestowing a set of resources on the future. The Sages sought to safeguard the
intellectual tools with which later generations might create their own version of
the Oral Law.
Such an interpretation of their purposes properly views the law as a living
thing. A living tradition survives not because it is fixed, but because it is adapt-
able. Thus, if the Torah survives as a living tradition, it survives not merely
because the Oral Law has been written down at a particular moment in time,
but because the Oral Law can never be fully written down and is therefore
never fully and finally completed. No amount of writing by the Sages or by
later commentators can perfectly describe it or complete it. In fact, the very
attempt to write down the law at a particular point in time leads to still more
commentary, and still more writing. The attempt to codify the Oral Law must
always fail, and the full understanding of the law must always be projected into
the future. But that is the secret of the law’s endurance. Under this view, the
Torah as a whole—including both its written and its oral aspects—lives because
it moves with time, rather than being fixed against time. It lasts because it is
always becoming; it endures because it is never finished.
The Torah differs from the Constitution because the former by tradition is
the word of God and the latter is the product of limited, fallible, and mortal
human beings. Nevertheless, these ideas about the complementary relationship
between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah have obvious analogies to
theories about the interpretation of an ancient and venerated Constitution.
Like Jewish law, the Constitution is an institution that spans many generations.
To survive as an institution its content must not be completely fixed. It must
possess a combination of elements—some which change, and some which do
not change. And to each generation must be given the tasks of redeeming the
law’s promises in its own time, and of making the law its own.
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